Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress—and a Plan to Stop It

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The Book

  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • PART I: The Flaw
    • 1. Tweedism
      • The Green Primary
    • 2. Corrupt Because Unequal
    • 3. Consequences: Vetocracy
    • 4. The Fix
      • Vouchers
      • Matching Funds
      • Would More Funders Make the Problems Worse?
      • But What Would All This Cost?
      • What These Changes Would Do for “Lobbying”
    • 5. Distractions
    • 6. What about “Free Speech”?
  • PART II: Deeper
    • 7. Why So Damn Much Money
      • Demand for Campaign Cash
      • Supply of Campaign Cash: Substance
      • Supply of Campaign Cash: New Norms
      • Supply of Campaign Cash: New Suppliers
      • Lobbyist$
      • Economies, Gift and Otherwise
    • 8. What So Damn Much Money Does
      • The Deviations That Money Inspires
      • 0. It Matters Not at All
      • 1. Extortion
      • 2. Distraction
      • 3. Distortion
      • 4. Trust
      • Okay, But Is Money the Real Root?
    • 9. How So Damn Much Money Defeats the Left
    • 10. How So Damn Much Money Defeats the Right
      • 1. Making Government Small
      • 2. Simple Taxes
      • 3. Keeping Markets Efficient
    • 11. How So [Damn Little] Money Makes Things Worse
      • The Ways We Pay Congress
      • The Benefits of Working for Members
    • 12. Two Conceptions of “Corruption”
      • “Corruption”
      • “Dependence Corruption” Is “Corruption”
      • What Follows
  • PART III: Unconventional Thoughts
    • 13. A Proposing Convention
      • The Movement on the Left
      • The Movement on the Right
      • “A Convention”
      • The Risk in the “Runaway”
      • Safety Valve 1: Limits on the Convention
      • Safety Valve 2: The Courts
      • Safety Valve 3: The Safety Valve Itself
      • Leave the Lawyers, Return to Real Politics
      • Risks
      • One Way Forward
      • Fair Deals
    • 14. Referendum Politicians
      • The Referendum President
      • Referendum Representatives
  • Conclusion
  • Afterword
  • Notes
  • Index
Lawrence Lessig

by Robert Scoble

About the Author

Lawrence Lessig is the Roy L. Furman Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. Prior to rejoining the Harvard faculty, Lessig was a professor at Stanford Law School, where he founded the school’s Center for Internet and Society, and at the University of Chicago. He clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals and Justice Antonin Scalia on the United States Supreme Court.

Lessig serves on the Board of Creative Commons and the AXA Research Fund. He is a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the American Philosophical Association, and has received numerous awards, including a Webby Life Time Achievement Award, the Free Software Foundation's Freedom Award, Fastcase 50 Award and being named one of Scientific American's Top 50 Visionaries.

Lessig holds a BA in economics and a BS in management from the University of Pennsylvania, an MA in philosophy from Cambridge, and a JD from Yale.